By Salisu Suleiman
If anything has emerged from WikiLeaks’ exposure of thousands of secret cables from American diplomatic missions worldwide, it is the confirmation that there is only a superficial line between diplomacy and espionage. The details and complexity of some of the cables also indicate that American intelligence networks have become victims of their own success.
From Nigeria alone, reports indicate that there are over 4000 cables, dating back to the 1960s. This boils down to about 1000 cables every ten years or 100 every year. Of course, thousands more must have been discarded, as only first class intelligence make it to the highest echelons of the US State Department. The frantic efforts of the US government to prevent further leakages suggest that the WikiLeaks documents are the real thing.
Nigeria’s intelligence agencies should be interested in the CIA’s ‘mission contacts’ in Nigeria (local spies) that provide information to the American (and probably other foreign intelligence agencies). Who are the moles that sell us out at every stage to foreign interests? And what is the level of penetration of the Nigerian government by these foreign intelligence agencies and commercial interests? And the final question: does the Nigerian government have any secrets that have not been compromised?
All these questions bring us the crux of today’s piece: the role of Nigeria’s intelligence agencies and operatives in not only protecting the country’s interests by gathering strategic (as against pedestrian) intelligence critical to our national security, but ensuring that foreign intelligence operations and operatives in Nigeria are identified, and possibly fed false information through the nuances and subtleties expected of intelligence agencies and operatives. Do our intelligence agencies have any idea of who is spying on what in the country? Do we have efficient counter espionage mechanisms and operatives? The inferences from the details exposed by the WikiLeaks revelation on Nigeria are alarming.
Many factors account for this scepticism. The discussion between President Jonathan and former US Ambassador to Nigeria Robin Saunders shows clearly that the president was not briefed nor prepared for the meeting. It was a meeting between a very efficient intelligence operative and a self-confessed novice. But beyond the Jonathan debacle is the revelation of the existence of moles in virtually every arm of government. Interested foreign intelligence officials and their governments already know policies that are yet to be articulated by the Nigerian government. It must be the dream of every career intelligence official to be posted to Nigeria. It must be the easiest place to gather intelligence unhindered and without the fear of being deliberately fed incorrect information by counter-operatives who are well versed in the spying game.
Apart from gathering strategic intelligence abroad, how efficient are our intelligence agencies in sourcing and processing local intelligence? How come the US was aware of the Boko Haram uprising while Nigerian agencies had little or no information? In spite of the huge (and largely undisclosed) sums spent by the federal and state governments on ‘security’, how come the Independence Day and Christmas Eve bombers got away with the planning and execution of their terrorist plots?
Is there any truly intelligent intelligence agency in Nigeria?
